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2 
Abstract 
 
The international community currently favours an approach to development 
that stresses a triangular linkage between security, good governance and 
economic development. This approach clearly informs the European Union’s 
agenda in Africa, which has progressively integrated governance and 
security elements. This paper will show that this agenda is at least as much 
determined by the bureaucratic and national affiliations of the concerned 
EU actors as it is by African realities and international trends. African 
security indeed triggers a competition between the different European 
institutions, eager to be the driving force for a policy that can offer some 
additional resources and autonomy. The consistency and the credibility of the 
EU security policy in Africa will therefore depend on the responses provided 
to these institutional rivalries.  
 
 
Introduction  
 
The international community has been, over the last two decades, developing a holistic 
approach to development that stresses the linkage between security, good governance 
and economic development. The idea that drives this triangular approach is that 
development can only be achieved in a secure and democratic environment, conducive 
to long-term investments. This evolution can be traced back to the early 1990s, when 
political conditionality was added to what were formerly essentially economic 
development programmes (Robinson, 1993). Shortly thereafter, a security dimension 
was added to the ‘good governance-economic development’ nexus, which came with a 
new diagnosis. It is now assumed that conflict and under-development are rooted in 
state failure and that in order to prevent future crises, state weakness must be 
addressed through broad institutional reforms. The international community thus 
attempts to ‘bring the state back in’ (Evans et al. 1985), that is to re-establish its 
authority through capacity-building reforms.   
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3 
The risks and limits entailed by this type of holistic approach are increasingly 
highlighted. Some argue, in particular, that the merging of development and security 
programmes is likely to promote a more military-based approach to development 
programmes. This may lead donors to favour security objectives over economic 
development and/or governance issues1 and provide them with the means to include 
traditional military assistance in development budgets. Authors thus underline that 
the three concepts – security, development and governance – may not be as naturally 
compatible as – and may even clash more often than - is implied by the current holistic 
approach to development (Châtaigner, 2004). Others question the uncritically accepted 
link between democracy and political stability, insisting that democratisation often 
brings about instability and can thus jeopardise a state’s developmental strategy 
(Mansfield and Snyder, 1995). More generally, critiques underline the risks and limits 
of the current agenda that aims at transforming societies as a whole according to the 
one and unique liberal democracy model, whatever the realities and needs in the field 
(Duffield, 2001; Paris, 2003).  
 
In spite of such reservations, the above-described understanding of the links 
between development, good governance and security clearly informs the European 
Union’s policy agenda in Africa. Through the so-called ‘multi-functional approach’ 
outlined in the European Security Strategy - the so-called ‘Solana Document’, adopted in 
December 2003 (Council of the European Union, 2003) - the EU is also promoting a 
holistic approach, where security, economic development and democracy are seen as 
essential contributions to the generation of political stability in the EU’s international 
environment. In doing so, the EU positions itself as a major actor on the international 
scene, one that can propose a multi-dimensional approach to crisis management and 
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4 
therefore claim the status of international power (Piening, 1997; Bretherton and 
Vogler, 1999; Soeterdorp, 1999). The EU insists on its added value as a multi-
institutional organisation likely to provide all types of crisis management tools – 
civilian and military as well as humanitarian – within a unique framework. Because of 
the multiplicity of the problems it is facing - war, poverty, humanitarian catastrophes, 
and so forth -, the African continent would seem to fit with this multi-functional 
approach. 
 
This case study of the EU security policy in Africa shows that the linkage between 
security, governance and development relies for a large part on institutional dynamics. 
The EU security policies in Africa are at least as much determined by the bureaucratic 
affiliations of the concerned EU actors (Allison, 1971; Halperin and Kanter, 1974; 
Egeberg, 1999) as they are by African realities. African security can be seen as a field 
where EU actors are improving their institutional capacities: in fact, EU African 
security policies are often driven by internal power relations. The importance of these 
institutional dynamics can be seen through a threefold process: 
- First, African security is a field likely to provide a new legitimacy for 
development policies led by the European Community (EC), which is 
responsible for the management of first pillar activities; 
- Second, African security is a field of experimentation for the institutional  
actors responsible for the definition and implementation of the CFSP (Common 
Foreign and Security Policy) – the so-called second pillar; 
- Third, African security is a field of Europeanisation for traditionally bilateral 
member-state security policies.    
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5 
The consistency and credibility of the EU security policy in Africa will depend on the 
convergence between these three processes.  
 
African security, a field of  re-legitimisation for the 
European Commission?  
 
For some years now, a discourse that emphasises the role of security as a precondition 
for development has emerged within the EU’s community institutions. The first EU 
document focusing on African conflicts was proposed by the Commission (1996a) and 
promoted the notion of ‘structural stability’, which underlined the key-role played by 
development in the prevention and regulation of African conflicts. Increasing 
involvement in African conflict management issues constitutes a means for the 
Commission and its Directorate General Development (DG Dev), to respond to the 
doubts expressed about the efficiency of its development strategies in Africa (European 
Commission, 1996b and 2000), and the general validity of development aid (Lister, 
1998a). Sub-Saharan Africa, which has long remained the very first and principal 
operational field for the community’s external relations institutions and DG Dev in 
particular (Lister, 1998b), is increasingly perceived as a difficult field for the promotion 
of economic and social development through aid. This in turn explains the growing 
attention given to conflict prevention and management through military means 
(Olsen, 2002). This security angle in the approach to development is determined by the 
interests of some Directorates General (DGs) within the Commission – DG Dev, in 
particular, often tends to consider Africa as its ‘exclusive territory’ (Dimier, 2002 and 
2003) – in defending their privileged geographic area of intervention and investing in 
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6 
a functional field in which they do not traditionally intervene. From the early 2000s, 
the EC has thus been entering the African security field on tiptoes, through the 
politicisation and securitisation of its development policy.  
 
Politicisation and securitisation of EC policies 
 
Relations between the EU and sub-Saharan Africa have long been reduced to the sole 
issues of trade and development cooperation through the Yaoundé and subsequent 
Lomé partnership agreements between the EU and the Africa-Caribbean-Pacific (ACP) 
group of states (Lister, 1998b; GEMDEV, 2000). EU-Africa relations are being 
increasingly politicised and securitised, however, as was apparent in the two last Lomé 
agreements and their successor, the Cotonou Agreement, signed in 2000.2 The 
adoption, by the EU, of the comprehensive approach that links good governance and 
development is evident in the Cotonou Agreement. Human rights, democratic 
principles and the rule of law are defined as ‘essential elements’ in the Cotonou 
Agreement: a violation of any of these elements may lead to a suspension of EU 
assistance and trade cooperation with the concerned ACP country.3 Meanwhile, the 
very first article of the Cotonou Agreement closes the development-good governance-
security triangle by underlining that the agreement was concluded ‘with a view to 
contributing to peace and security and to promoting a stable and democratic political 
environment’ (Cotonou Agreement, 2000 and 2005, art. 1), thus emphasising the third 
dimension – security.  
 
The real innovation in the Cotonou Agreement, however, is the introduction of a 
‘political dialogue’ between the EU and the ACP in article 8, which should ‘contribute 
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7 
to peace, security and stability and promote a stable and democratic political 
environment’. After five years of implementation and some criticism, the mid-term 
revision of the Cotonou Agreement, in 2005, allowed for some adjustments. It was 
thought, in particular, that the preventive dimension of the ‘political dialogue’ as 
defined in article 8 was underused. Under the revised Cotonou Agreement, the 
dialogue should be held before the consultation procedure provided by article 964 of 
the same agreement can be launched. This amendment clearly strengthens the political 
dimension of the Cotonou Agreement, while the provision for a systematic dialogue 
with each partner country in effect complements the work of the EU special 
representatives (EUSR) sent to troubled regions and thus draws a link with the CFSP 
dimension of the EU’s relations with Africa.5 The assistance provided to partner 
countries is increasingly political rather than purely technical and the concept of rule 
of law clearly drives some of the reforms advocated in the Cotonou Agreement (art. 
33).  
 
The politicisation and securitisation of the EC’s policies in part reflects the current 
trends in and influences on donor policies. Among the fundamental principles set in 
article 2 of the Cotonou agreement is ‘ownership (of the development strategies)’, a 
widely used concept in donor and multilateral agency documents nowadays. It is 
indeed hoped that reforms and policies will rapidly be appropriated by local 
governments and communities so as to guarantee the sustainability of these reforms 
and prevent further external interventions.6 Another major trend is the current 
realisation that the world is increasingly interconnected and interdependent: Western 
powers now feel more threatened by ‘public bads’, i.e. collapsed or so-called ‘rogue’ 
states whose political disorder or aggressive policies may put their security at risk 
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8 
(Fearon and Laitin, 2004), rather than by other major powers. The politicisation and 
securitisation of development policies are thus justified not only by moral rights and 
the failure of previous development policies, but also by what M. Duffield (2001) calls 
‘enlightened self-interest’: promoting development and good governance is in the 
interest of the international community as a whole since it will help prevent local 
conflicts and insecurity from spilling over. There again, the Cotonou agreement 
strongly reflects this trend: terrorism (art. 11a), migration (art. 13), drugs and 
organised crime (art. 30) and environmental protection and the management of natural 
resources (art. 32) are inter alia identified as common concerns that should be jointly 
addressed by the parties to the agreement.   
 
The principles set in the Cotonou agreement are accompanied by concrete policies 
and instruments. The European Commission classifies its conflict prevention and 
peace-building efforts into two categories: direct and indirect initiatives. Direct 
initiatives range from humanitarian activities to support for conflict resolution 
initiatives and institutional reforms, while indirect initiatives refer to the 
mainstreaming of conflict prevention objectives into sector programmes, from 
development to trade.  
 
Among direct initiatives are the humanitarian actions led b  DG ECHO, the 
European Community Humanitarian Office created within DG Dev in 1992 and 
transformed into an independent DG in 2004. Humanitarian action is a shared 
competence, but it is implemented by the Commission’s institutions, and more 
precisely by DG ECHO, which enjoys an important latitude within the Commission, 
while its impartiality is established in article 7 of the humanitarian aid regulation 
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9 
(Council of the EU, 1996 and 2001a). In fact, the policies managed by ECHO are far 
from politicised. DG ECHO strictly defines humanitarian assistance as an apolitical, 
neutral and impartial activity: DG ECHO is not part of the ‘crisis management’ system 
and is therefore not a crisis management instrument, as the humanitarian policy does 
not aim to stabilise a political situation nor to prevent a crisis and can therefore not be 
considered a political instrument. 
 
Direct initiatives also comprise early warning and action mechanisms. The 
Commission, its geographic desks and in-country delegations, are asked to closely 
monitor the political situation in all countries and to deliver assessments based on a 
list of root causes of conflict.7 These assessments are then used, by the General 
Secretariat of the Council and the Commission, to prepare a watch-list of countries at 
the start of a new Presidency every six months. In addition, risk factors are to be taken 
into account during the drafting of the Commission’s Country Strategy Papers8 so as 
to ensure a coordinated approach to conflict prevention. The Crisis Management and 
Conflict Prevention Unit, within the Commission’s Directorate General External 
Relations (DG Relex), played an instrumental role in the introduction of these conflict 
assessments and in the integration of risk factors in the Country Strategy Papers. 
More importantly, however, the Crisis Management and Conflict Prevention Unit is in 
charge of coordinating and mainstreaming the Commission’s conflict prevention and 
management activities. As part of DG Relex, it also provides the necessary link 
between the Commission’s institutions in charge of conflict prevention and 
management and their Council counterparts.9  
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10 
Two supplementary, more technical tools, complement the ‘early warning and 
action’ system. The Rapid Reaction Mechanism (RRM), managed by the RRM 
Management unit within the Commission’s DG Relex, has been used since 2001 to 
quickly bring a host of measures to bear on a conflict situation. The RRM can only 
finance a non-humanitarian operation where other instruments cannot respond within 
the necessary time frame, and for no longer than six months. A specific budget line, 
the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR), which is 
managed by the Commission’s DG EuropeAid,10 also finances both election 
observation missions and thematic crisis prevention actions, such as training, media, 
civic and voter education, generally conducted by partner NGOs and international 
organisations (European Commission, 2001; Gourlay, 2006a).11  
 
The Commission at times seems to suggest, in its policy documents, that any 
development programme can contribute to conflict prevention (European Commission 
website). This all-encompassing understanding of conflict prevention has not 
prevented the EU, however, from conceiving indirect initiatives in the form of more 
targeted policies that aim to practically link trade and security concerns. Of particular 
significance here are the efforts to regulate the trade of particular goods fuelling 
violent conflicts. The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme, that aims to prevent 
the trade of so-called ‘blood diamonds’,12 and the EU Action Plan for Forest Law 
Enforcement, Governance and Trade (FLEGT), which regulates the trade of timber,13 
are two cases in point. The EU’s ‘Everything But Arms’ initiative also underlines its 
willingness to promote economic development while mitigating the negative impact of 
trade liberalisation: it thus grants duty-free access to imports of all products from least 
developed countries without any quantitative restrictions, except to arms and 
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11 
munitions.14 The EU’s efforts do not stop with its import activities, however: Europe 
has also shown signs that it was ready to take responsibility as an exporting region, 
especially with regard to weapons. Article 11 of the Cotonou Agreement underlines 
the partners’ willingness to address the issue of landmines and the proliferation of 
small arms and light weapons (SALW). Efforts to regulate the trade of arms, however, 
remain tentative: the Council adopted a code of conduct on arms exports in 1998, but 
this is not a legally binding instrument and European member-states are among the 
world’s largest arms suppliers (Hugues, 2006). 
 
The EC, a unified actor?  
 
The intermingling of fields in conflict prevention and management policies requires 
close coordination between the different branches of the Commission. In fact, unclear 
divisions of labour are problematic inside the Commission, between its different 
sectors and directorates general. In the name of mainstreaming, DG Trade and DG 
Dev are asked, for instance, to carefully take into account the conflict prevention 
precautions pointed out by DG Relex. It is obvious, however, that these DGs often 
pursue different, or even contradictory, objectives. DG Trade will want to defend the 
EU’s commercial interests, DG Relex will be careful to increase the EU’s security, 
external relations and international visibility, while DG Dev should contribute to 
increased prosperity in the ACP states.  
 
The EU’s current commitment in favour of regional integration illustrates the 
difficulty of coordinating and reconciling these different objectives. While African sub-
regional organisations are increasingly considered key in the African security 
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12 
architecture and the strengthening of their conflict prevention and management 
capabilities is increasingly supported, the Cotonou Agreement foresees the 
establishment of Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) between the EU and ACP 
regional organisations. At first sight, these two objectives would seem consistent. 
Some observers, however, underline that they may lead to very contradictory results. 
The official rationale behind the EPAs is to enhance regional integration in the ACP 
and integrate their economies into the world economy, thus creating incentives for 
increased cooperation – and regional peace – and breaking away from the ACP’s 
traditional isolation and underdevelopment. One of the principal aims of these EPAs, 
however, is also to submit EU-ACP trade relations to World Trade Organisation 
(WTO) rules, and to suppress the non-reciprocal trade arrangements that long 
prevailed between the EU and the ACP. External observers and representatives of the 
ACP states have already, on numerous occasions, underlined the flaws in this ‘peace 
and development through free trade’ logic and the risks entailed by a rushed-in 
liberalisation and integration of trade in the ACP countries. The risks concern, first, 
individual states: the opening-up of the ACP countries’ trade borders, it is feared, will 
deprive their governments of important trade-related revenues and force their often 
nascent public services and industries into a competition they are not yet able to face 
(Goodison, 2007). Authors have also underlined that the EPAs may fail to fulfil their 
primary objective, i.e. foster regional cooperation, by benefiting external – European – 
suppliers rather than regional ones (Gibb, 2000). The trade liberalisation entailed by 
the EPAs could, finally, create more ground for conflict than for peace: changes in 
commodity prices may exacerbate livelihood insecurity and create social tensions, and 
will also make it more difficult to control the flow of arms or conflict resources 
(Ochieng, 2005). The EC’s willingness to pursue EPA negotiations in spite of these 
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13 
objections casts some doubt on its capacity to reconcile its different interests and 
institutions.  
 
The Community pillar is not, finally, exempt from the interplay of national 
interests. Member-states, and France in particular,15 do not hesitate to emphasise their 
contribution to the European Development Fund (EDF) to favour the one or the other 
programme when these are discussed by the EDF Committee.16 They can also push 
forward their national interests through the presence of their European civil servants 
within the Commission. Belgian European civil servants, for instance, are important 
actors in the EU policy in Africa - in the Commission and in the Council17 - and can 
sometimes be seen, especially within DG Dev, as promoting Belgium’s national 
perceptions.18 
 
African security, a field of  experimentation for the 
European Security and Defence Policy? 
 
A number of documents and instruments adopted over the last few years illustrate the 
second pillar’s growing interest in and concern for Africa’s security problems, as well 
as its desire to become increasingly involved in their resolution. A major step was 
made with the adoption, in May 2001, of the Council Common Position concerning conflict 
prevention, management and resolution in Africa. This common position developed at 
length an element that would thereafter constitute one of the essential bases of the 
EU’s security strategy in Africa, that is the idea of an increased multilateralism 
through a strengthening both of the capabilities of African regional organisations and 
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14 
of the EU’s partnership with these organisations and with the United Nations (UN). 
This principle of multilateral cooperation is also emphasised in the European Security 
Strategy (Council of the European Union, 2003).  
 
Although all these documents in theory provide a clear framework that could 
enhance the coordination of the European member-states’ activities in Africa, most of 
the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) proposals still lack a practical 
translation. The clearest signs of the latter are the appointments of special 
representatives of the EU or of the Presidency to specific parts of Africa,19 but these 
appointments are still made on an ad hoc basis and cannot, therefore, be interpreted as 
a systematic ‘diplomaticisation’ of the EU’s presence in Africa. The exclusively 
political dimension of the CFSP, which would require deep institutional reforms and 
would most obviously threaten the member-states’ sovereign monopoly in 
international relations, thus remains underdeveloped. This in turn partly accounts for 
the fact that the EU has increasingly invested in the development of another 
dimension of the CFSP, the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), perceived 
as a more technical and possibly straightforward policy field.   
 
Africa, a field of validation for the CFSP/ESDP means and 
procedures  
 
The field of conflict prevention and management in Africa constitutes an ideal field of 
experimentation and validation (Bagayoko, 2004a), especially for the Petersberg tasks, 
which comprise humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat 
forces in crisis management, including peacemaking.20 Operation Artemis,21 launched 
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15 
within the ESDP framework and led from June to September 2003 in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (DRC), was clearly a founding act in the mobilisation of the second 
pillar instruments in Africa (Olsen, 2002; Faria, 2004). Beyond the geographic 
expansion of the ESDP potential field of intervention – it had not until then expanded 
beyond the Balkans -, Operation Artemis also inaugurated a new form of partnership 
between the EU and the UN (2003).  
 
More importantly, however, the new EU military structures gained legitimacy 
both from an external and an internal perspective: 
- First, Artemis proved that the EU was able to plan military operations 
autonomously, without resorting to NATO means and instruments, as had been the 
case for all ESDP operations led in the Balkans.22 The operation was indeed entirely 
and exclusively planned within the EU’s military structures – the EU Military 
Committee (EUMC) and Military Staff (EUMS) – which then worked in close 
coordination with France, the ‘framework nation’ in charge of operational planning. 
An alternative to the resort to NATO’s Supreme Headquarters of Allied Powers in 
Europe (SHAPE) was thus successfully tested. Africa is now often seen by ESDP 
actors as a field of European influence that could escape the strict implementation of 
the ‘Berlin Plus’ option23 and where the ESDP could gain increasing international 
credibility; 
- Artemis also provided the ESDP with an increased legitimacy within the EU 
institutional architecture. Operation Artemis established that the decision procedures 
at the politico-military level – which depend on the relations between the Political and 
Security Committee (PSC) and the EU Military Committee – could lead to rapid 
decisions, contrary to what had been suggested by the long planning delays for 
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16 
Operation Concordia, launched in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 
(FYROM) earlier in 2003.     
 
Operation Artemis also paved the way for conceptual innovations, such as the joint 
proposal by France and the UK – joined by Germany – to develop a new ‘battlegroup 
concept’, that is the creation of battlegroups of about 1,500 troops with the appropriate 
supporting units,24 able to intervene anywhere and more particularly in ‘collapsing 
states’. These battlegroups are again meant to be part of the EU-UN partnership as 
they should be available for autonomous operations, in response to UN requests for 
participation in Chapter VII operations. They may also be seen as a potential 
experimentation field for the concept of ‘differentiated integration’ (Irondelle and 
Vennesson, 2002), which would enable willing states to intervene without being 
paralysed by internal differences within the EU.   
 
Finally, Operation Artemis gave way to other ESDP operations which 
consolidated the EU’s contribution to peace and post-conflict reconstruction in the 
DRC. Two subsequent missions were indeed launched in the DRC, this time with a 
Security Sector Reform (SSR)25 focus. EUPOL Kinshasa is a police mission in the 
capital city Kinshasa, which contributes to the training of the Integrated Police Unit 
(IPU). EUSEC DR Congo, on the other hand, provides assistance and advice on the 
necessary reforms to the Congolese authorities in charge of security since June 2005. 
Another military operation, finally, recently confirmed the EU’s capacity to lead an 
efficient, albeit short-term, mission with a clear objective. EUFOR DR Congo was 
deployed in Kinshasa from 12th June to 30th November 2006, during the period 
encompassing the elections in the DRC. All three missions in the DRC were or are led 
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17 
in very close coordination with the UN – EUFOR, like Artemis, was meant as a 
support to MONUC – and the Congolese authorities. A fifth mission, led in Darfur 
(Sudan), was meant to show that the EU is also able to implement at the operational 
level its partnership with the AU and to contribute to Africa’s security as defined in 
the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) Action Plan for Africa26 adopted in 
2004. The EU civilian-military supporting action to AMIS II, the AU’s mission in 
Darfur, provides the AU with political, military and technical assistance, equipment 
and training at least until the UN/AU hybrid operation is deployed in Darfur. The EU 
is now seriously considering launching a complementary, bridging ESDP operation ‘in 
support of the multidimensional UN presence in Eastern Chad and North-Eastern 
Central African Republic with a view to improving security in those areas’ (Council of 
the European Union, 2007).  
 
These last EU operations in Africa illustrate a major trend in ESDP operations, 
also obvious in the Balkans, the first experimentation field for the ESDP: the 
increasing development of the ESDP’s civilian dimension, where the EU has made 
faster operational progress than in the military dimension initially seen as a priority in 
the development of an EU crisis response (Nowak, 2006). The military dimension of 
the ESDP indeed represents a narrower field of action for the EU, which remains 
essentially dependent on NATO’s crisis management means – two of the four 
exclusively military ESDP operations led so far were implemented within the Berlin 
Plus framework. Only very few European member-states, moreover, have the political 
will, capacity and experience necessary for military interventions; France and the UK 
thus support half of the EU’s budgetary expenses and two thirds of its research 
expenses. Member-states thus now seem to agree on the rapid development of civilian 
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18 
crisis management, where the EU has an added value in comparison with other 
international organisations such as NATO (Bagayoko and Kovacs, 2007).  
 
The introduction of civilian elements has however led to the transformation of the 
type of EU involvement in Africa. While the development of ESDP activities in Africa 
was initially meant to provide rapid reaction means, these operations are in effect 
increasingly taking on a long-term approach (Gowan, 2004) – EUSEC DR Congo and 
EUPOL Kinshasa have now already exceeded 18 months. This ‘civilianisation’ of the 
ESDP in Africa has important implications for inter-institutional coordination. It 
requires, first, close coordination between the military and civilian dimensions of 
ESDP operations – an increasing number of ESDP operations, such as the current 
supporting action to AMIS II, combine civilian and military elements -, a coordination 
made more difficult by their separate management by different institutions and 
funding instruments within the second pillar.27 Second, while the military dimension of 
the ESDP is a second pillar exclusivity, its civilian dimension is necessarily linked to – 
and, at times, overlaps with – the community pillar’s civilian activities: The 
Commission, for example, managed EDF funds in support of the SSR programme in 
the DRC and close coordination with the subsequent Council-led SSR operations, 
EUPOL Kinshasa and EUSEC DR Congo, was therefore essential.    
 
Unclear division of labour within the second pillar 
 
The European security structures are very young28 and are therefore all struggling for 
legitimacy. This legitimacy must be won: first, against external actors, such as NATO 
(and particularly the US interests within it); second, against older and more 
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19 
experienced EC institutions; third, one against another. The Political and Security 
Committee (PSC), composed of the member-states’ PSC ambassadors, plays a central 
role in the definition and follow-up of European crisis responses. It provides the 
political control and strategic direction for the ESDP operations, basing its decisions 
on the recommendations expressed by the Military Committee (EUMC) and the 
Committee for civilian aspects of crisis management (CIVCOM). The EUMC is 
composed of the member-states’ military commands; it follows the progress of military 
operations, makes recommendations to the PSC on all military aspects of the ESDP 
and gives instructions to the EU Military Staff (EUMS). CIVCOM, on the other hand, 
was created in 2002 to define and supervise civilian operations. It is also in charge of 
seeing to the inter-pillar coordination of the EU’s civilian actions.  
 
To these Council institutions must be added the General Secretariat of the Council 
(GSC), led by the Secretary-General of the Council of the EU and High Representative 
for the CFSP (SG/HR), with its directorates general. Among them, the DG E, in 
charge of external relations, is divided into geographical and functional directorates. 
The responsibility to coordinate the management of African security issues is at the 
heart of a competition between these directorates. If DGE VIII – in charge of defence 
issues - were tasked with coordinating the activities in Africa, it could gain renewed 
legitimacy. Indeed, DGE VIII is currently having some difficulties in imposing its 
views on the Military Staff, also located within the GSC. Moreover, both DGE VIII 
and the Military Staff are also competing with NATO. Because the ESDP is comprised 
of two closely interlinked fields - military and civilian crisis management -, the 
recently established civilian-military cell could also seek the responsibility of trying to 
coordinate the civilian and military aspects of the EU security policy in Africa. 
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20 
Nevertheless, DGE IX, which is in charge of the civilian aspects of crisis 
management29 and has no rivalry with NATO, is perhaps in a better position at the 
moment: indeed, DGE IX seems to be getting closer and closer to the Commission 
services – such as DG Dev or DG ECHO – in charge of implementing civilian 
programmes in the security field.  
 
Finally it is also important to stress the role played by professional interests, which 
have appeared since the launching of the ESDP. In fact, a new profession has emerged 
within the traditionally civilian organisation which the EU used to be. The military 
officers stationed in Brussels are trying to promote both their values (such as symbolic 
patriotism) and their working methods (such as a culture of planning) as opposed to 
those of their civilian counterparts (Bagayoko, 2006). Whatever their nationality, they 
generally feel they have more in common with military counterparts from other 
countries than with the European civil servants coming from their own country. These 
rivalries and the perceived necessity to consolidate an EU military profession may lead 
to additional tensions and attempts at investing new fields in the name of the 
development-governance-security triangle.  
 
African security, a field of  Europeanisation for member-
states security policies?  
 
African security issues offer an interesting field, where European member-states can 
make their security policies meet, interact, coordinate, and in effect, ‘Europeanise’. C. 
Major defines Europeanisation as ‘an ongoing, interactive and mutually constitutive 
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21 
process of change linking national and European levels, where the responses of the 
member-states to the integration process feed back into EU institutions and policy 
processes and vice versa’ (Major, 2005: 177). Through its security policy in sub-
Saharan Africa, the EU indeed aims to ‘integrate the policies and actions of its 
member-states’ (Ginsberg, 1989). But the launching of a dynamic ESDP in Africa is 
also the symptom of the Europeanisation strategies of the former colonial powers’ 
traditional African policies and of their capacity to be the driving force for a collective 
policy on the continent.  
 
EU Member-states and African security 
 
Traditionally, most EU member-states do not identify any significant political or 
economic interest in Africa. Germany, in particular, has long insisted on the necessity 
to limit the ESDP to the enlarged European space and been hostile to the idea of any 
EU involvement in the management of Africa’s conflicts. But the former colonial 
powers have been successful in recent years in generating a growing interest for 
African security matters among their European partners.  
 
Rather than being a driving force, France has long been an obstacle to the EU’s 
further involvement in African security issues. France’s unilateralist policy in Africa 
acted as a disincentive on other European states, which were reluctant to associate 
their image and the image of the EU with a policy often considered neo-colonial. 
France, however, is now increasingly trying to obtain a multilateral legitimacy for its 
interventions on the continent. The integration of French interventions within the 
ESDP framework could allow it to remain involved on the African continent – still 
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22 
considered a central asset for France’s position on the international scene – while 
rendering groundless the accusations of paternalism and neo-colonialism. Operation 
Artemis offered an interesting illustration of the progressive Europeanisation of 
France’s involvement in African crises30 and proved that European member-states 
could decide collectively to contribute to a crisis management operation that had been 
initially wanted by one of them only. Operation Artemis was thus an interesting 
synthesis of the interests of the EU and one of its member-states, since it reconciled a 
young ESDP in search of credibility and a former colonial power in search of 
legitimacy after some deeply contested unilateral interventions. It also enabled France 
to re-engage in the Great Lakes region and beyond, in Central Africa, from which it 
had progressively withdrawn since the much criticised Operation Turquoise in 
Rwanda. Beyond these central political issues, the Europeanisation of its Africa policy 
also enables France to share the costs of military and defence cooperation. This desire 
to rationalise the costs of the French military cooperation first translated into the 
efforts expended since 1998 towards the emergence of inter-African capabilities of 
crisis management. This was essentially done through the Programme for the 
strengthening of African peacekeeping capabilities (RECAMP -Renforcement des 
Capacités Africaines de Maintien de la Paix), which is based on a regional approach to 
assistance and lies at the heart of the multilateralisation of the French security policy 
in Africa.31 The objective, regularly stressed since 2002,32 is to make RECAMP ‘the 
operational reference for the ESDP in Africa’, that is a federative framework for EU 
member-states’ security policies in Africa. The future of RECAMP is now clearly 
linked to France’s capacity to convince its European partners to participate in the 
financing and equipment as well as training of African armies. 
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23 
The Franco-British rapprochement in Saint-Malo led to both the creation of the 
ESDP and the Europeanisation of the two countries’ African policies, even though the 
UK has since seemed less anxious than France to Europeanise its African policy. Since 
2001, the United Kingdom’s efforts to develop African peacekeeping capabilities – 
through British Peace Support Teams (BPST) which are providing training in former 
British colonies - have become part of a much more ambitious conflict prevention 
project known as the Africa Conflict Prevention Pool (ACPP), which draws together 
the conflict-prevention resources of the Department for International Development 
(DFID), Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and Ministry of Defence (MOD). 
The thematic focus of the ACPP, from enhancing peace support operations capabilities 
to addressing the economic and financial causes of conflict, underlines a holistic 
understanding of conflict prevention. The UK has placed a strong emphasis on African 
peacekeeping by setting up a special fund, the Africa Pool.33 The UK highly values its 
bilateral activities in Africa. Unlike the French, the British are not worried when their 
activities do not have a European label: their approach is less institutional than the 
French one. At this stage, the British consider that their bilateral programmes in 
Africa are very efficient, particularly in the SSR field, and therefore do not need to be 
Europeanised.  
Portugal is also an important European actor in Africa. Since the early 1990s, it 
has been developing technical and military cooperation with African Portuguese-
speaking countries (PALOP). Portugal also has its own African peacekeeping 
capabilities support programme, the Programme for the support of Peace Missions in 
Africa (PAMPA - Programa de Apoio às Missões de Paz em África). Like France, 
Portugal would like the PAMPA programme to be integrated in the EU training 
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policy framework. Portugal, however, does not wish the programme to be fully 
Europeanised.   
 
EU member-states seem increasingly convinced of the importance of Africa to 
European security. The rather impressive list of contributing nations to EUFOR RD 
Congo confirms this.34 Moreover, some member-states such as the Netherlands or 
Sweden have in effect recently stepped up their involvement in African security issues. 
Alongside France and Portugal, Belgium - which recently resumed a more active 
Africa policy after having largely withdrawn from the African scene following the 
assassination of ten of its parachutists in Kigali in 199435 - is one of the most active 
supporters of a substantial European commitment in Africa. It is followed on this by 
Spain and Greece. 
 
Disagreements between member-states 
 
Germany’s position has considerably evolved, over the last years, from reluctance to a 
readiness to contribute to short-term ESDP missions, such as EUFOR, whose 
operational command was provided by Germany. Nevertheless, there is still a lot of 
reluctance, especially within the German Ministry of Defence, to engage more in 
Africa. Germany is very anxious to prevent the EU from taking a neo-colonialist turn 
and imposing its views on its African partners. The new EU member-states, which 
have no traditional African policy nor specific interest in this geographical area,36 are 
generally in favour of reinforcing African capabilities in order to create an autonomous 
African security system and avoid increasing costs to the EU.  
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25 
Indeed, funding constitutes a central issue. Their limited defence budgets can lead 
some countries to favour a European option, in order to see the EU shoulder part of 
the cost of their African security policy. Some member-states, such as France or 
Portugal, thus share a strong desire to have access to the Community development 
cooperation funds, although they are not ready, in exchange for this, to hand over their 
management of military cooperation to Community actors. This preoccupation can 
explain why their African security policies are increasingly trying to promote the 
linkage between security, governance and development, as suggested by the RECAMP 
concept (RECAMP5 website). Other European partners wish to avoid a situation 
where some member-states’ African policies would be funded by the EU, especially by 
the EC budget. Germany, Austria, and the Netherlands are thus particularly cautious 
when it comes to funding EU security activities in Africa. Most new member-states 
share this financial concern: they wish to see a fair balance between the structural 
funds they receive and the development aid dedicated to non-EU states.   
 
Moreover, countries such as Germany and the Nordic countries favour an ethical 
approach (Châtaigner, 2004) and consider that development funds should not be used 
to finance the ESDP, whose progress they do not consider as crucial as France does. 
The UK, on the other hand, is already implementing a policy that clearly puts the 
stress on the linkage between security and development. The British position on the 
question is therefore not so much driven by ethical concerns as it is by a reluctance to 
‘Europeanise’ a policy that is considered already efficient at the national level.  
 
Finally, the issue of multilateral cooperation with other Western actors is another 
bone of contention. France’s insistence on involving the EU in Africa can be read as an 
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26 
attempt to avoid coordination with other actors, and in particular with NATO and the 
United States.37 The UK, on the other hand, insists on the necessity of coordinating 
EU member-states’ activities with non-European actors such as the United States, 
Canada and Norway. The EU strategy for Africa and the G8 Gleneagles Plan for 
Africa are viewed as totally interconnected. The British, followed in this by Germany, 
also promote cooperation between NATO and the EU.38  
 
Inter-institutional relations: competition or cooperation?  
 
Each and every new policy paper focusing on the EU’s security policy in Africa insists 
on the necessity of inter-institutional and inter-pillar coordination and mainstreaming. 
In fact, one of the conditions of success of the European approach to conflict 
prevention and management in Africa depends on the EU’s capacity to overcome the 
rivalries born out of the different institutions’ desire to play the role of a ‘lead agency’ 
on these issues. Some of the strategic choices made by the EU in Africa therefore 
depend on the interests of each department involved in the continent’s affairs and are 
often the result of compromises between these departments. It appears that the linkage 
between security, governance and development is still frequently at the core of an EU 
inter-institutional competition, although some recent evolutions also show that the 
EU institutions increasingly share a common vocabulary and approach to African 
security issues.  
 
Cross-pillars rivalries 
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27 
The Commission can have a determining influence over the implementation of the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) on the African continent (Krause, 2003) 
– for example through the implementation of CFSP sanctions adopted by the Council 
or through the mobilisation of first pillar resources for the implementation of common 
actions – but also over the implementation of the European Security and Defence 
Policy (ESDP). The African Peace Facility (APF) provides an interesting illustration 
of the institutional issues at stake in the linkage security-development: it is a good 
example of the Commission’s capacity to encroach on the Council’s prerogative over 
the CFSP and ESDP. The APF is a funding instrument dedicated to financing 
peacekeeping operations led by African actors. Launched in 2004, the APF was funded 
from the resources of the 9th European Development Fund (EDF), which is drawn 
from member-states’ voluntary contributions. Although the EDF is not part of the 
Community budget, the Commission is in charge of managing it, which gives it a 
determining influence. With regards to the African Peace Facility itself, however, the 
member-states have the last word. The APF was supposed to be a provisional 
instrument and its perpetuation created heated debates between member-states and 
the Commission.39 Some object that the APF ‘diverts’ funds that were initially meant 
for development aid towards security concerns. The issue of the APF also had a 
concrete impact on the considerable disagreement between the Commission and the 
member-states over the notion of ‘effective ownership’40 through multilateral 
cooperation and the terms of its implementation. The debate, in effect, concerned the 
type of African multilateral organisation that should be supported. The use of the 
African Peace Facility was therefore at the centre of a competition between the 
Commission, which wanted the APF to focus on support to the AU,41 and the GSC and 
some member-states, which wanted these funds to be also – or even exclusively – used 
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28 
to support sub-regional organisations.42 This debate found a de facto – provisional – 
conclusion when the AU was called upon to intervene in Darfur: The € 200 million, 
which were earmarked in the initial APF for peace support operations, were thus 
nearly exclusively allocated to the AU missions AMIS I and II (NEIMACRO, 2006). 
The EU agreed, in April 2006, to provide an additional amount of € 300 million under 
the 10th EDF to be able to continue the APF for another three-year period (2008-
2010).43 
 
Another example of the EU institutional rivalries over African security is the 
recent case brought before the Court of Justice of the European Communities, which 
also underlines the problems entailed by the unclear division of labour between 
Council and Commission. In February 2005, the Commission, in an action against the 
Council, accused it of assuming the right to contribute to ECOWAS in the framework 
of the Moratorium on Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW). For the Commission, 
the Council decision affects Community powers in the field of development aid, since 
actions against the spread of SALW are already covered by the Cotonou Agreement 
and the regional indicative programme for West Africa (Court of Justice of the 
European Communities, 2005).  
 
Finally, it is important to underline that inter-institutional rivalries may 
sometimes also originate in philosophical divergences. The position of DG ECHO is a 
telling example. As mentioned above, DG ECHO strictly defines humanitarian 
assistance as an apolitical, neutral and impartial activity: it thus contests that 
humanitarian missions can be considered as an integral part of the ESDP military 
missions, as currently defined by the Petersberg tasks. The development of the ESDP 
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29 
has indeed led some, within ECHO, to fear even greater confusion between 
humanitarian and military actors. These positions explain in large part the near 
absence of contacts between DG ECHO and the EUMS, the EUMC or the General 
Secretariat’s DGE VIII. DG ECHO rejects the political pressure emanating from the 
second pillar institutions and denounces what it thinks is a desire to use humanitarian 
activities for political purposes.   
 
Towards increased cooperation?  
 
The current evolution towards longer missions, with a growing civilian dimension and 
a focus on good governance and sustainable development, renders essential a tight 
cooperation between the civilian and military crisis management activities of the 
second pillar and the traditionally civilian activities of the first pillar (Gourlay, 2006b; 
Kohl, 2006).  
 
The GSC, the Commission and the EU member-states have recently engaged in 
common reflections on the EU’s policies in the field of African security. A first 
important document, the EU Strategy for Africa, was jointly designed by the 
Commission and the GSC and adopted in December 2005. This document defines the 
EU’s general strategy in Africa and therefore goes beyond the sole security aspects. 
Nevertheless, the very first section of the document deals with ‘Peace and Security’ 
and recommends: fostering the African Peace Facility (APF) through a long-term 
arrangement; building EU engagement in Africa on member-states’ bilateral activities; 
assisting the AU in implementing the African Standby Force (ASF); providing support 
to African military and civilian operations (including the deployment of battlegroups); 
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continuing efforts to fight the production and the circulation of small arms and 
involving Africa in the struggle against terrorism.44 This broad document, however, 
did not give way to any practical implementation.  
 
In November 2005, following a French request,45 the Political and Security 
Committee (PSC) asked the Commission and the General Secretariat of the Council 
(GSC) to design a Concept for strengthening African capabilities for the prevention, 
management and resolution of conflict. This concept seeks to enhance the coordination 
between the European Community, the second pillar and member-state activities and 
promotes three categories of measures. The first category comprises measures meant 
to strengthen consistency and coordination at the EU level by ensuring coherence 
between the EU’s different institutions, developing a support and coordination 
structure and ensuring consistency of financial support. The second set of measures 
focuses on a strengthened partnership with the AU and the sub-regional organisations. 
The third group of measures, finally, aims to strengthen African capabilities by 
providing support for the training of African troops; this will probably be done by 
opening member-states’ depots and by turning member-states’ training programmes – 
such as the French RECAMP, the only bilateral programme to be mentioned as such 
in the concept paper – into means for delivering EU policies. The PSC made note of 
the Concept on 29th September 200646 and stated that it should be seen as part of the 
implementation of the EU strategy for Africa. The GSC and the Commission were 
once again invited to explore and find practical ways of implementing the options 
proposed in the paper, in cooperation with African partners. Indeed, a number of 
financial and institutional issues remain unresolved, that underline the disagreements 
that still oppose member-states as well as the rivalries within and across pillars. 
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31 
Meanwhile, there is no obligation, in the concept paper, for member-states to proceed 
with the implementation of the concept. 
 
As far as funding is concerned, there is an urgent need to address the absence of 
harmonisation of the existing financial tools. At the moment, financial resources from 
member-states have to be mobilised to support African capabilities such as military 
training, not eligible for funding under the CFSP budget47 or the African Peace 
Facility (APF). Some progress has been made since the adoption, in November 2006, 
of the Instrument for Stability, which aims to ensure a better linkage between short-
term crisis response and long-term development instruments.48 This instrument 
adopts a comprehensive approach, as it aims to contribute to stability in situations of 
crisis or emerging crisis and to help build local capacities to address specific global and 
trans-regional threats and pre- and post-crisis situations, often rooted in bad 
governance and under-development. Its capacity to solve current funding issues, 
however, will in great part depend on the interpretation that the EU institutions 
choose to make of it. While it clearly combines a number of formerly separate 
instruments,49 it does not as yet provide a clear perspective on the future of other 
instruments such as the African Peace Facility. Article 4.3 of the regulation 
establishing the instrument for stability would nonetheless seem to suggest some ways 
of complementing, if not replacing, the APF.50 Certainly, this new instrument will be 
the object of further inter-institutional negotiations, which will most probably in turn 
determine its efficiency. Whatever the results of these negotiations, some problems 
will remain, however: the status of military cooperation, in particular, remains unclear.  
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32 
The strengthening of the coherence between the EU’s different institutions is also 
a complex problem. Some member-states have proposed the implementation of a 
coordination structure that would be both responsible for coordinating bilateral 
activities of EU member-states and for planning EU activities in Africa. The 
implementation of such a coordination structure is related to the EU architecture 
itself: it is interesting to note that a geographical question – security on the African 
continent - can create functional development at the EU institutional level. At the 
moment, there is no agreement concerning the institutional situation of this structure. 
France wishes to promote the establishment of a cell – in effect a European equivalent 
of the French Military and Defence Cooperation Directorate (Direction de la 
Coopération Militaire et de Défence – DCMD) - within the GSC, which would be 
responsible for preparing, coordinating and implementing EU activities in Africa. 
Other member-states, such as Portugal or the UK, are against the establishment of a 
rigid permanent coordination structure, particularly if it is supposed to take initiatives, 
as the concept paper suggests. They support the implementation of a lighter 
mechanism, for example a coordination cell introduced within the Africa Task Force in 
the Policy Unit which is already bringing together all Africa-related activities.  
 
The coordination of member-states training programmes is another issue at stake 
here. France would like to make the RECAMP concept an operator for EU activities in 
Africa and extend the ‘framework nation’ concept to African-European partnerships – 
France being the natural candidate to this position. This ‘framework nation’ concept, 
however, remains to be defined; it is not clear, in particular, how the strategic direction 
of activities in Africa would be shared between the ‘framework nation’ and the EU 
organ in charge of the political control and the strategic direction of EU operations – 
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namely the PSC. Whereas the UK used to insist on how important it was for member-
states to keep control over their national programmes, it now seems more willing to 
collaborate with France.  
 
Conclusion  
 
The EU’s security policy in Africa provides an interesting example of the coordination 
and competition processes within the Community first pillar, within the second pillar 
and across these pillars. One of the biggest challenges for the EU policy in Africa will 
most probably be cross-pillar coordination, that is the coordination of CFSP/ESDP 
activities and EC development programmes. Reconciling their objectives is obviously a 
matter of close coordination and institutional diplomacy.51 The examples of the 
African Peace Facility and Instrument for Stability show that devising new 
instruments alone does not constitute a sufficient response to inconsistencies, and that 
much depends on ad hoc institutional interpretations and experimentation in the field. 
Some coordination issues will also remain unresolved as long as the documents 
defining the EU’s external relations and security policies and instruments are not 
clarified and adjusted to the current international environment and to the EU’s most 
recent institutional evolutions. 
 
Beyond this and more importantly, the EU’s policy in Africa is an interesting case 
study in how new international relations concepts – here the linkage between security, 
governance and development - can in reality be widely driven by institutional issues. 
Indeed, the linkage between security, governance and development, which informs the 
EU’s current security policies in Africa, largely relies on institutional dynamics and 
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national interests within the EU. African security, more than security in the Balkans – 
where the EU has traditionally intervened in close coordination with NATO -, 
represents an ideal field for internal development and legitimisation within the EU: It 
has the potential to provide for the re-legitimisation of the EC’s development policies, 
the experimentation and development of the ESDP and the Europeanisation of 
member-states’ Africa and security policies. This three-fold process, however, also 
suggests far-reaching institutional ambitions and interests: African security triggers a 
competition between the different European institutions, eager to be the driving force 
for a policy that can offer some additional resources and autonomy. Meanwhile, the 
triangle formed by security, governance and development pre-supposes coordination 
and cooperation between these same institutions, which are little used to working 
together. Some of the inconsistencies observed in the field, when policies are actually 
implemented, can in turn be explained by this experimentation process and the inter-
institutional dynamics it is linked to.  
 
 
Number of words (including notes): 12,395 
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1 J.-M. Châtaigner (2001) gives two examples of obvious clashes between donors’ security, governance and 
development agendas in Africa. The fist concerned the external military assistance granted to Guinea when 
it was attacked on its Eastern border with Liberia and Sierra Leone in 2000-2001: contrary to general 
practice, no requirement of transparency in the Guinean state’s security system was attached to this 
assistance. On the other hand, Rwanda and Uganda continued to receive development aid while their 
troops were directly and openly supporting rebel troops in the Congolese war.  
2 It is important here to put the stress on the EU institutional sharing of responsibility. While the Council 
is responsible for negotiating international treaties, the Commission is in charge of implementing their 
community elements. The Commission, however, also enjoys a power of initiative and often designs the 
treaties. This is especially the case of the EU-ACP agreements, which the Commission’s DG Dev and, since 
the Cotonou Agreement, DG Trade are in charge of managing and implementing.     
3 The Council actually wanted to add ‘good governance’ to the list of essential elements, but was opposed 
here by the ACP countries that felt that the three essential elements already covered the most important 
aspects of good governance and that its inclusion could lead to arbitrary decisions. Good governance, 
therefore, is a ‘fundamental element’, that is with the exception of serious cases of corruption, a state facing 
governance problems will be offered support and advice to improve its performance (Council of the 
European Union, Cotonou Agreement, article 9.3).  
4 An Article 96 procedure can be launched if a party to the agreement – the European Community and the 
member states of the European Union or an ACP state – considers that the other party has failed to fulfil 
an obligation stemming from respect for human rights, democratic principles and the rule of law. This 
consultation procedure can lead to the adoption of ‘appropriate measures’ and, as a last resort, to a 
suspension of the agreement (Mackie and Zinke, 2005).  
5 The EUSRs promote the CFSP in troubled regions and countries and play an active role in efforts to 
consolidate peace, stability and the rule of law. They report to the Secretary-General of the Council of the 
EU and High Representative for the CFSP (SG/HR).   
6 M. Duffield (2001), however, underlines that the notion of ‘ownership’ carries a somewhat hypocritical 
dimension in that reforms and policies remain externally-induced and highly disruptive, however ‘owned’ 
they might appear: ‘People in the South are no longer ordered what to do – they are now expected to do it 
willingly (sic) themselves’ (p. 34).  
7 Root causes are listed under eight headings: legitimacy of the state; rule of law; respect for fundamental 
rights; civil society and media; relations between communities and dispute-solving mechanisms; sound 
economic management; social and regional inequalities; geopolitical situation (European Commission, no 
date).  
8 Each Country Strategy Paper (CSP) is drafted during negotiations between the European Commission 
and the concerned country’s government and thereafter signed by both parties. It provides a framework for 
European Commission assistance programmes under the Cotonou Partnership Agreement for periods of 
five years.  
9 The Commission’s representative within the Council’s Political and Security Committee (PSC) and the 
Committee for civilian aspects of crisis management (CIVCOM) is a member of the Crisis Management and 
Conflict Prevention Unit.  
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10 DG EuropeAid is assisted in this by the Human Rights and Democracy Committee, which is comprised 
of member-states’ representatives and is chaired by a representative of DG Relex. It examines financial 
planning and delivers opinions on projects over € 1 million.  
11 The Instrument for Stability, established in November 2006, repeals, in particular, the Rapid Reaction 
Mechanism (RRM). We will come back to this Instrument for Stability in the last part of this paper.  
12 The EU has been a participant of the Kimberley Process since its inception. The scheme is implemented 
through a Council Regulation applicable in all member-states, which lays down the procedures and criteria 
to be followed in the import and export of rough diamonds into and from the EU and sets out provisions 
for self-regulation by the European diamond industry. The European Commission actively supported the 
setting-up of the monitoring system and chairs the Kimberley Process this year. 
13 The Action Plan places particular emphasis on forest governance reforms and capacity building in 
timber-producing countries. FLEGT actions should also aim at developing multilateral cooperation to 
reduce the consumption of illegally harvested timber in the EU (European Commission, 2003).  
14 Imports of rice and sugar, however, are not fully liberalised yet, which has triggered considerable 
criticism against the seemingly generous ‘Everything But Arms’ initiative. Duties on those products will be 
gradually reduced until duty free access will be granted for sugar in July 2009 and for rice in September 
2009. 
15 France has traditionally been the very first contributor to the EDF - its contribution represented 24.3 % 
of the 9th EDF (2003-2008). This is about to change, however, as Germany will be the first contributor to 
the 10th EDF (2008-2013), while France’s share will drop to 19.5 %. 
16 Interview with an EC delegation staff member in Bissau, Guinea-Bissau, March 2006. The EDF 
Committee consists of member-state representatives and meets every two months in order to validate the 
programmes proposed by the Commission.  
17 There are, generally, many Belgian civil servants working within the European Commission: The latest 
figures published by the Commission (July 2007) show that Belgian civil servants represent 21 % of the 
Commission’s staff. This is very obviously due to the Commission’s headquarters being located in the 
Belgian capital city, Brussels (European Commission Civil Service, 2007). Beyond this figure, Belgian civil 
servants have, lately, occupied key-positions with regards to the EU’s security policy in Africa: The 
Commissioner for Development and Humanitarian Aid, Louis Michel, is, of course, Belgian, as are the head 
of the Council Secretariat General’s Africa Unit and the Deputy Head of the Crisis Management and 
Conflict Prevention Unit in the Commission’s DG Relex.  
18 On the role played by member-states and their appointed Commissioners and civil servants in the 
shaping of Community policies, see, in particular, Dimier, 2006.  
19 Mr Aldo Ajello holds the position of EU Special Representative for the Great Lakes region since March 
1996, Mr Pekka Haavisto was appointed EUSR for Sudan in July 2005, while Mr Hans Dahlgren’s mandate 
as the Presidency’s special representative for the Mano River region has been regularly renewed since 
2001.  
20 The Petersberg tasks were defined in the Petersberg Declaration, adopted by the Western European 
Union (WEU) Council of Ministers on 19th June 1992 and subsequently integrated word for word into 
article 17.2 of the Amsterdam Treaty in 1997. These tasks thus constitute the legal definition of the 
European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). There is a real resolve, within the EU, to broaden the 
initial scope of the Petersberg missions to take on board the new threats to European security and the post-
9/11 international security environment. To that end the draft Constitutional Treaty stipulated that the 
Petersberg tasks ‘shall include joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military 
advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis 
management, including peace-making and post-conflict stabilisation’ (Article III-309). In spite of the non-
adoption of the Constitutional Treaty, the extended Petersberg missions are being implemented de facto, as 
is shown in the assistance provided to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) (Assembly of Western 
European Union, 2007). 
21 Launched on 12th June 2003, Operation Artemis aimed to prevent a humanitarian catastrophe in Ituri, in 
the North East of the Democratic Republic of Congo, then torn up by the violent fighting opposing the 
Hema and Lendu ethnic groups. The operation was thus explicitly mandated by the UN’s Security Council 
(Resolution 1484) in order to maintain the security in the camps hosting the internally displaced, secure the 
airport in Bunia and protect civilians, UN staff and humanitarian agencies in the region. The aim was to 
ensure the control of the situation while the mandate of the United Nations Mission in the DRC (MONUC) 
was reinforced and its strength increased.  
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22 As shown by its ongoing support to the AU mission in Darfur (AMIS), NATO has however since 
stepped up its interest and expertise in Africa, which tends to qualify this idea that Africa could constitute 
an ideal field for the experimentation of an autonomous European defence.  
23 Berlin Plus is a strategic partnership agreement between NATO and the EU. It allows the EU to make 
use of NATO’s logistical and planning means in its crisis management activities.  
24 In response to a crisis, or to an urgent request by the UN, the EU should be able to undertake two 
battlegroup-size operations for a period of up to 120 days simultaneously. Forces should be on the ground 
no later than 10 days after the EU decision to launch the operation. Larger member-states will generally 
contribute their own battlegroups, while smaller members are expected to create common groups. Each 
group will have a ‘framework nation’, which will take operational command, based on the model set up 
during the Operation Artemis. 
25 Taking as a basis the guidelines set by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD), the EU has now defined the security sector as a system which includes: the core security actors, 
that is armed forces, police, paramilitary forces, intelligence and security services; the security management 
and oversight bodies within the executive and legislative branches and in civil society; the justice and law 
enforcement institutions; and the non-statutory forces such as liberation or guerrilla armies, private 
security companies and political party militias. Security Sector Reform (SSR) involves addressing issues of 
how the security system is structured, regulated, managed, resourced and controlled. It seeks to increase 
the ability of a state to meet the range of both internal and external security needs in a manner consistent 
with democratic norms and sound principles of good governance, human rights, transparency and the rule 
of law (Council of the European Union, 2006).  
26 This document, adopted by the Political and Security Committee (PSC) on 16th November 2004, sets out 
the following recommendations: provision of technical advice, liaison officers to be sent to the AU and to 
the sub-regional organisations, database of African officers trained by EU member states in Europe or in 
Africa, expert teams responsible for supporting the planning of operations led by the AU and the sub-
regions, training by EU staffs of African military and civilians in DDR, and so forth (Council of the 
European Union, 2004a).  
27 While the military side of the ESDP is essentially conceptualised and implemented by the EU Military 
Committee (EUMC) and Military Staff (EUMS), its civilian side is managed by the Committee for civilian 
aspects of crisis management (CIVCOM).  A civilian-military cell was created within the EUMS in 2004 to 
enhance civilian-military coordination in crisis management operations. This cell is, however, only 
responsible for coordination within the second pillar. The civilian and military aspects of the ESDP are also 
financed separately: the civilian aspects are covered by the CFSP budget or additional financial instruments 
such as the African Peace Facility, while military expenditures are managed by a special mechanism called 
‘Athena’ (Council of the European Union, 2004b).  
28 The ESDP was launched during the June 1999 European Council held in Cologne and was declared 
operational in the December 2001 European Council held in Laeken.  
29 The following therefore report to DGE IX: the Police Unit, which plans and leads crisis management 
missions comprising a police deployment; the Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit (Policy Unit), an 
instrument of strategic and geopolitical analysis at the service of the High Representative for the CFSP; 
and the Situation Centre (SITCEN), in charge of 24-hour intelligence, analysis and warning.  
30 Operation Artemis was not strictly speaking the result of a European initiative; it was in fact initially a 
French intervention that was subsequently Europeanised. At the beginning of May 2003, in response to the 
UN General Secretary’s call, France considered intervening in the RDC, at the head of an international 
coalition. The initial operation, named ‘Mamba’, was eventually proposed by the French diplomacy to its 
European partners and took place within the ESDP framework. In accordance with the Council Decision of 
12th June 2003, the operation’s command was entrusted to France, which took on the role of ‘framework 
nation’. In fact, the operational headquarter of Operation Artemis, set up in Paris, benefited from the work 
that had been previously for Operation Mamba. Constituted by a small core of French officers, the 
Operation’s high command was joined by officers from other member-states as well as by liaison officers 
from the EU Military Staff. France also provided the high command on the ground (Bagayoko, 2004b).  
31 As shown by the Operation Licorne in Côte d’Ivoire or recent interventions in Chad and the Central 
African Republic, France has departed from its abstentionist attitude of 1995-2002, although French 
engagement is now justified as a way to support African capabilities when these need to be complemented. 
France is also reorganising its military forces permanently stationed on the continent according to the 
African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), as defined by the African Union.  
32 In fact, two concurrent options for more effectively developing and fostering the RECAMP concept were 
put forward: Some advocated developing the partnership with sub-regional organisations and coordinating 
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RECAMP with other bilateral initiatives such as the US ACOTA programme and the UK African 
peacekeeping support programmes; the other option consisted in promoting the partnership with the AU 
and the EU’s involvement. In September 2005, during his traditional annual speech to the French 
ambassadors, President Jacques Chirac clarified the French position and called for RECAMP to be placed 
within the European framework.  
33 A key part of the UK’s long-term strategy to build African conflict management capabilities consists in 
supporting Security Sector Reform (SSR) projects. The largest British commitment in SSR is in Sierra 
Leone, where the UK actively supports the reform of the army, the police, the judiciary system, as well as 
ad hoc institutions such as the Anti-Corruption Commission, the Special Court and the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission, and provides technical assistance to the government of Sierra Leone (Leboeuf, 
2005). 
34 The following EU member-states contributed to EUFOR: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Czech Republic, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, 
Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom. Turkey, although not an EU-
member, is also among the contributing nations (Council of the European Union website).  
35 Belgium is particularly active in the Democratic Republic of Congo, which is a former Belgian colony. 
The Belgian Defence Ministry, in cooperation with South Africa, provides training support to Congolese 
troops. Belgium also provided logistical and operational training to the Beninese battalion about to be sent 
to the United Nations Mission to DRC (MONUC). 
36 Nevertheless, some of these new member-states are becoming more active in Africa: for instance, Poland 
contributed 150 soldiers to EUFOR (this commitment is linked to the close relationship between Poland 
and Germany, which commanded the EUFOR mission on the ground and provided funding for the 
strategic transport of Polish troops and for their logistics). A Hungarian observer was also sent to Darfur 
and afterwards to the Mali Peacekeeping School. 
37 For instance, the new ‘maritime section’ of the RECAMP concept that is devoted to strengthening 
African states’ sovereignty over their coastlines, is designed to counter American influence on offshore oil 
production in the Gulf of Guinea.  
38 For an interesting and more complete discussion of the interaction between member-states and between 
member-states and EU institutions with regards to Africa’s security, see Centre d’Analyse Stratégique, 
2006.   
39 The member-states discussed four options for the future financing of the APF. According to the first 
option, which was the one chosen in April 2006, new funds would be allocated to the APF from the current 
EDF. The second option offered to finance the APF through the CFSP budget under the new financial 
perspectives for 2007-2013. The role of the Commission would at the very least be reduced, while the 
European Parliament could control the use of the facility’s funds as part of its competence in the CFSP 
budget. The third option would lead to the creation of a new multi-annual and intergovernmental fund, 
which would be managed either according to the current APF procedure or through the ATHENA 
mechanism, currently used for the EU’s military operations. This type of fund would most probably be 
under the sole control of the member-states. According to the fourth option, the part of the APF which 
focuses on the building of the AU’s capabilities could be financed through Commission resources. EU 
Peacekeeping operations and any other type of EU military activity could ot, however, be financed within 
this framework and the European Parliament’s control would be limited to the small EU funds provided for 
AU activities.  
40 The concept of ‘effective ownership’ - or ‘African ownership’ – refers to the appropriation, by African 
partners, of the EU’s initiatives, in terms of financial and technical assistance and training, meant to 
increase their capabilities in conflict prevention, management and resolution. ‘Ownership’ therefore refers 
to the idea of ‘African solutions to African problems’, that is that Africans should assume responsibility for 
their own affairs.   
41 The Commission underlined that the AU had achieved considerable progress at the institutional level, 
and particularly through the creation of its Peace and Security Council. The AU’s Peace and Security 
Council could be seen as the New Economic Partnership for Africa’s Development’s (NEPAD) security 
organ. The Commission’s preference for the AU is therefore consistent with the link it has been drawing 
between development and conflict prevention and management policies.  
42 The GSC, spurred on by some member-states, favoured the sub-regional organisations and more 
particularly the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), which actually possessed the 
necessary operational experience and had started developing the adequate institutional framework (Nivet, 
2006). 
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43 Nevertheless, the nature of the final mechanism will certainly depend on the interpretation of the 
Instrument for Stability, launched in November 2006 in order to improve consistency and coordination 
between the Community’s short-term and long-term conflict prevention and management instruments 
(European Parliament and Council of the European Union, 2006).   
44 This strategic cooperation was complemented by a more theoretical work of conceptualisation and 
definition of post-conflict strategies meant to guide future EU policies and interventions. The Council has 
thus developed its own concepts of rule of law and of civilian administration in 2003. In 2006, two new 
concepts were jointly defined by the General Secretariat of the Council and the Commission: Security 
Sector Reform (SSR) and Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR). In the case of the SSR 
concept, two documents were drafted – one by the GSC, the other by the Commission – and thereafter 
joined under a single cover (Council of the European Union, 2006).  
45 The French request directly stemmed from the will to Europeanise the RECAMP concept and to involve 
the EU in the training of African forces. France was very active, throughout 2006, in lobbying for the 
definition of this concept.  
46 From July to September 2006, the final version of the concept paper underwent a validation process, 
during which five working groups of the Council - the political-military group (PMG), the Africa-
Caribbean-Pacific (ACP) group, the Africa working (COAFR) group, the Military Committee (EUMC) and 
the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM) - were asked to prepare 
recommendations relating to the concept. 
47 The CFSP budget cannot fund any expenditure of military character: the Treaty on European Union 
states that military expenditures are jointly financed by the member-states, but the latter do so outside the 
Community budget and in accordance with the Gross National Product scale (Treaty on European Union 
(TEU), Article 28.3, second paragraph). A special mechanism called ‘Athena’ has been put in place to 
manage these expenditures (Council of the European Union, 2004c).  
48 The Instrument for Stability, however, does not represent the kind of institutional leap made in February 
2000, when the European Commission created the European Agency for Reconstruction, which was 
initially in charge of implementing the EU’s assistance to Kosovo. Its mandate was thereafter extended to 
Serbia, Montenegro and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. This independent community 
agency is accountable to the European Council and Parliament and was initially mainly in charge of 
ensuring the transition from emergency to reconstruction and development aid. It now essentially manages 
the projects financed by the European Community in support of reform programmes in the region.   
49 As far as Africa is concerned, these are: the Action Against Anti-Personnel Landmines in Developing 
Countries; Rapid Reaction Mechanism; North-South Cooperation in the Campaign Against Drugs and 
Drug Addictions; Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Operations in Developing Countries.  
50 ‘Article 4.3 Pre- and post-crisis capacity building – Support for long-term measures aimed at building 
and strengthening the capacity of international, regional and sub-regional organisations, state and non-
state actors in relation to their efforts in: (a) promoting early warning, confidence-building, mediation and 
reconciliation, and addressing emerging inter-community tensions; (b) improving post-conflict and post-
disaster recovery. Measures under this point shall include know-how transfer, the exchange of information, 
risk/threat assessment, research and analysis, early warning systems and training. Measures may also 
include, where appropriate, financial and technical assistance for the implementation of those 
recommendations made by the UN Peacebuilding Commission failing within the objectives of Community 
cooperation policy.’ (European Parliament and Council of the European Union, 2006).  
51 The practice of negotiation within the EU pertains to a logic that is specific to the EU’s governance 
mode: as shown by Marc Abélès (1996; Abélès and Bellier, 1996), the dominant mode of political exchange 
at the European level is based on continuous negotiations, be they negotiations between the European 
institutions and external actors (states, pressure groups) or internal negotiations between the European 
institutions’ staffs.  
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